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Ecosystem externalities arise when one use of an ecosystem affects its
other uses through the production functions of the ecosystem. We use sim-
ulations from a size-spectrum ecosystem model to investigate the ecosys-
tem externality created by fishing of multiple species. The model is based
upon general ecological principles and is calibrated to the North Sea. Two
fleets are considered: a “forage fish” fleet targeting species that mature
at small sizes and a “large fish” fleet targeting large piscivorous species.
Based on the marginal analysis of the present value of the rent, we develop
a benefit indicator that explicitly divides the consequences of fishing into
internal and external benefits. This analysis demonstrates that the forage
fish fleet has a notable economic impact on the large fish fleet, but the
reverse is not true. The impact can be either negative or positive, which
entails that for optimal economic exploitation, the forage fishery has to
be adjusted according to the large fish fishery. With the present large fish
fishery in the North Sea, the two fisheries are well adjusted; however, the
present combined exploration level is too high to achieve optimal eco-
nomic rents.
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1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
When a fish stock is fished, the impact of that fishing will also affect the
other stocks in the ecosystem. For example, fishing piscivorous species
should have a beneficial effect on their prey, whereas fishing forage species
should have a detrimental effect on their predators. Fishing on a stock
therefore incur an opportunity cost on other fisheries in terms of possible
smaller outcome. In economic terms this means that a fishing fleet not
only affects its own outcome but also, through the ecosystem, imposes
externalities on other fleets and ecosystem users.
If fishery management have to move beyond the traditional single
stock approach, the opportunity cost of catch from different stocks has
to be apparent and perceptional. Our aim is to evaluate how one use of
an ecosystem, here one fleet, indirectly affects others users, here other
fleets, and develop an indicator that demonstrates this opportunity cost.
By dividing the economic consequences into internal and external benefits
we elucidate how the fishing fleets affect each other and thereby provides
guidance into possible trade offs between fishing fleets in the exploitation
of the ecosystem.
Accounting for the interaction between fleets requires an ecosystem
model that captures the multi-species nature of the ecosystem. Purely
data-driven approaches, e.g., analysis of catch data, are unable to pro-
vide an understanding of the drivers and dynamics within an ecosystem.
One approach in the fishery economics literature is to use simple concep-
tual models to obtain qualitative insights on ecosystems (Hannesson 1983,
2002). The most common approach is to investigate the interaction of two
or more trophic levels using Lotka-Volterra-type predator-prey models,
e.g., Wilen and Wilen (2012). Such models capture the predator-prey in-
teractions of different species, however, by characterizing each species by
its biomass only, they fail to account for the large variation in size within
each species. Individuals within a fish species varies in size from about
0.001g to their asymptotic size of between about 10 g from forage fish to
between 10 and 100kg for the largest predatory fish. The size of individu-
als characterizes their interaction with other individuals (big individuals
eat smaller ones), their bioenergetics, fisheries gear selectivity and, more
important in this context, their economic value. To adequately resolve the
ecological and the economic reality of the ecosystem (Tschirhart 2009) we
therefore use a size-based model of the ecosystem.
There is a growing literature describing different types of size-spectrum
models (Benoît and Rochet 2004; Pope et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2006; Hartvig,
Andersen, and Beyer 2011) and their application to understanding how
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marine ecosystems respond to fishing (Pope et al. 2006; Hall et al. 2006;
Andersen and Pedersen 2010; Blanchard et al. 2014). These models are
based on a few simple and generally accepted assumptions at the level
of the individual organisms and their dynamics are explicitly driven by
predation and individual growth. Individuals in the model are character-
ized by their size (weight). As fishing gear is size-selective and the prices
of landed fish also depend upon size, these models are ideally suited
for economic reasoning and calculations. We use a previously developed
and calibrated size-spectrum model represent the ecological reality of the
ecosystem (Hartvig, Andersen, and Beyer 2011; Andersen, Brander, and
Ravn-Jonsen 2015). We use the model to calculate how a change in fishing
on one fleet affects the abundance and sizes of fish target by other fleets.
To illustrate the applicability of the benefit indicator we use the North
Sea fishery as a case. For this system data for the value of the different
fish species broken down into size groups is available. To simplify the
description we focus on the internal and external benefits of two fleets:
the forage fleet targeting small species and the consumer fleet targeting
large species. We use the benefit indicator to show that the forage fish fleet
has a notable economic impact on the large fish fleet, but that the reverse
is not true. The impact can be either negative or positive, depending upon
the level of exploitation in the system, i.e. forage fishing may even have
positive externality on the large fish fleet. For the North Sea we find, that
at the current level of large fish fishery, the level of the forage fish fishery
leads to an adequate externality. To achieve the optimal total benefit from
fishing the ecosystem, however, the present combined exploitation level
must be reduced.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The biological model is briefly
explained in section 2, the benefit indicator is derived in section 3, the
economic model is developed in section 4, and our results are presented
in section 5 and discussed in section 6. In the supporting material (Ravn-
Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard 2015) there is additional information
on: the estimation of the cost parameters (Chap. A), the estimation of the
price model (Chap. B), the details of the biological model (Chap. C), the
sensitivity analysis of some of the cost parameters (Chap. D), and the
sensitivity of the model to the choice of the control variable (Chap. E).
2. E C O S Y S T E M M O D E L
The size- and trait-based model is well described elsewhere (Hartvig, An-
dersen, and Beyer 2011; Andersen, Brander, and Ravn-Jonsen 2015), and
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we will only provide a general description of the basic principles here.
For a complete description, see Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard
(2015, Chap. C). The aim of a trait-based, size-spectrum model is to cal-
culate the abundance of individuals, N(w, W), as a function of the size of
the individuals, w, and the asymptotic (maximum) size that the individ-
ual may reach, W (Fig. 1 panel A). The representation of the trait W as a
continuous variable makes it possible to circumvent the need to represent
specific species; the diversity of the fish community is instead character-
ized by the attribute of their asymptotic size W. The central process in
the model is that large individuals eat smaller individuals. This predator-
prey interaction leads to a decrease in prey abundances and to somatic
growth (production) of large predator individuals. All of the parameters
in the size-spectrum model are related to individual weight, which makes
it possible to formulate the model with a small set of general parameters,
prompting the labeling of the model as “charmingly simple” (Pope et al.
2006). The equations and parameters of the models are described in Ravn-
Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard (2015, Chap. C).
To disclose the opportunity costs of fishing at different trophic levels,
the fishery is divided into two fleets: one targeting small forage fish and
one targeting large piscivorous fish. In this context, forage fish refer to
fish that are prey all of their life. The forage fish fleet is then characterized
by catching small fish from fish species that mature at small sizes, and
their harvest is used for industrial reduction into fishmeal and oil. The
large fish fleet catches piscivorous fish, i.e., fish species that are relatively
large when mature, and are sold for direct human consumption.
Fishing in the model is represented by the product of the overall fish-
ing mortality, F , and the selectivity as a function of size and trait, ω(w, W).
The two fleets are characterized by the range of asymptotic sizes they
target; the forage fish fleet targets species with W < 512 g (solid lines
Fig. 1A), and the large fish fleet targets W ≥ 512 g (dashed lines Fig. 1A).
Hence the two fleets fishery are non-overlapping with respect to species.
The species are only interacting through the predator–prey relation. The
overall fishing mortality rate of the two fleets, (Ff,Fl), is the control vari-
able in the model. The size-selectivity is modeled as a trawl selectivity
curve with an S-shaped function (Fig. 1B). The output of the ecological
model is the harvest with respect to fish size (Fig. 1C), which gives the
revenue when multiplied by price and integrated over all sizes.
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figure 1 : Run of the model with the fishing effort of the two fleets
set to correspond with the current exploitation of the North Sea. Solid
lines represent the forage fish fleet, dashed lines the large fish fleet. A:
Density of fish, Ni(w), as a function of individual weight, w. Each thin
line represents a population that is characterized by the maximum size,
W, of individuals in the population. The thick black line is the sum of
all of the populations. The grey line is the background spectrum that
represents the plankton community that provides food for the smallest
individuals. B: Fishing size-selection function, ω(w). C: The density of the
harvest. The total harvest is the integral under the curves; however, as the
abscissa represents the size on the logarithmic scale, the areas under the
curves are scaled by the logarithm of their size to be visual comparable:
the plotted line is FωNw log(w).
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3. B E N E F I T I N D I C AT O R
To valuate the ecosystem wide effects of fishing, we develop a benefit indi-
cator that is the marginal change in the present value of the rent when the
system is brought from one steady state to another, taking the dynamic
effects of the ecosystem during the change explicitly into consideration. A
change of state is prompted through a change in the fishing pressure of
one of the fishing fleets. The consequences of a change are characterized
by the internal benefit of the fleet that imposes the change and the external
benefit experienced by the other fleet.
Each fleet has one control variable, the overall fishing mortality rate
(Ff,Fl), where Ff is for the fleet targeting forage fish and Fl is for the
fleet targeting larger fish. We define continue as usual as keeping a constant
F and an action as changing F . To generalize the method, the two fleets
are called i and j, where (i, j) can be either (f, l) or (l, f).
The ecosystem services generated by the fleets i and j are the harvests
yi and yj —appraised by the rents (net values) pii and pij. Harvests and
the rents vary through time; to include the time component, the benefit
of fleet i is summarized by Yi and Vi, which are the present value of
the harvest and the rent, respectively, using the social discount rate ρ
(equivalent for fleet j):
Yi :=
∫ ∞
0
yi(t)e−ρt dt (3.1)
Vi :=
∫ ∞
0
pii(t)e−ρt dt (3.2)
We consider a baseline situation where the ecosystem is in equilib-
rium with its fleets and the outputs are constant. We consider a change
in the harvest of fleet i prompted by a change in Fi; the system will then
no longer be in equilibrium. Because of the restriction imposed by the
ecosystem functions, the change in fleet i’s harvest will lead to changes in
the harvest and rent for fleet j as well. As fleet j is continue as usual, the
changes in this fleet is an externality.
Because the change in Vj will depend upon ∆yi(t), we use a concept
from cost-effectiveness analysis (Garber and Phelps 1997; Kronbak and
Vestergaard 2013) and evaluate ∆Vj/∆Yi. We define the benefit indicator of
fleet j’s rent per unit of fleet i’s harvest at the limit, ∆Yi → 0, as:
Bj/i :=
∂Vj
∂Yi
(3.3)
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The definition in (3.3) is incomplete in itself. To make it rigorous it
has to be combined with the previous definition of continue as usual and
an action. We depart from
?
N(Fi,Fj) an ecosystem in equilibrium with
(Fi,Fj)
Depart from: Nt=0 =
?
N(Fi,Fj) (3.4)
At t = 0 fleet i change the fishing mortality while fleet j continue as usual.
To measure the indicator we expand the definition:
Bj/i =
∂Vj
∂Yi
(3.5)
=
∂Vj
∂Fi
(
∂Yi
∂Fi
)−1
(3.6)
=
(
lim
e→0
Vj(Fi + e,Fj)−Vj(Fi − e,Fj)
2e
)
·(
lim
e→0
Yi(Fi + e,Fj)−Yi(Fi − e,Fj)
2e
)−1 (3.7)
= lim
e→0
Vj(Fi + e,Fj)−Vj(Fi − e,Fj)
Yi(Fi + e,Fj)−Yi(Fi − e,Fj) (3.8)
As only i is doing an action only Fi is changed in line (3.6). The partial
derivatives are expanded into limits from both sides in line (3.7) to allow
for more precision in the numerical implementation. The benefit indicator
of the fleet itself, Bi/i, can be calculated in a similar fashion. Bi/i does not
measure an externality, but it is the net-benefit to the fleet of removing
one more fish, ignoring the externality of the fishing on the other fleet.
The total benefit indicator per unit of fleet i’s harvest is:
B•/i := Bi/i + Bj/i (3.9)
where the • indicates ‘summed over all fleets’. This benefit is the total
net benefit of removing one more fish, including opportunity costs. Here,
only two fleets are considered, but the expression can be generalized to an
arbitrary number of fleets by summing over all of the fleets. The benefit
will be a function of the current state of the ecosystem, and if the total
benefit is positive (negative), then it will, from an economic point of view,
be beneficial to increase (decrease) the harvest. If B•/i = 0 for both fleets,
then a marginal change in the harvest will leave the present value of the
rent flow unchanged. Such a point is a candidate for a situation with
optimum ecosystem services.
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3 .1 . model simulations
The deployed ecosystem model do not allow for analytical solution for
finding the benefit indicator. This section describes how the limit (3.8) is
estimated with numerical experiments on the model, and how the con-
tinuous formulation (3.1) and (3.2) are approximated with equivalent dis-
creet formulation.
The estimation is performed by allowing the model to run with mortal-
ity rates Fi and Fj until it converges to equilibrium
?
N(Fi,Fj).1 Two exper-
iments, A and B, that departures from the equilibrium are performed; in
both experiments, the fishing mortality of fleet j is fixed while the fishing
mortality of fleet i is changed: Fi(A) = (1− e)Fi and Fi(B) = (1+ e)Fi.
The change in fishing mortality leads to a dynamic response of the ecosys-
tem model. The experiment is run for T = 50 years, and the system has
converge to a new equilibrium. We use e = 10−6 as a suitable compro-
mise between precision (close to the limit e → 0) and numerical noise
(the signal is large relative to rounding errors in computation).
The harvest flows, yi(A) and yi(B), and the rent flows, pi j(A) and
pi j(B), are recorded (the bold symbols indicates that the flows are dis-
creet in time and represented as vectors pi = (pi0,pi∆t, . . . ,piT)). All of the
vectors are of length (T/∆t + 1), where ∆t is the time step in the model.
The changes in the present values are then calculated as:
∆Vj = PV(pij(B)−pij(A)) (3.10)
∆Yi = PV(yi(B)− yi(A)) (3.11)
The integrals involved in the present values are estimated as:
PV(pi) =∑
t∈{0,∆t,2∆t,...,T−∆t}
ρ−1
(
e−tρ − e−(t+∆t)ρ
)
pit + e−Tρ
piT−∆t
ρ
(3.12)
Here, ∑ (· · · ) calculates the present value from t = 0 to t = T, and
e−TρpiT−∆tρ−1 estimates the present value from t = T to t = ∞.
Finally the benefit indicator is estimated as
1In the model, the state variables, which are the density of the fish with respect to their
size, exhibit the form of travelling waves with diminishing amplitudes when the controls
are constant. The system is considered to converge to equilibrium when the coefficient of
variation over 25 years in all points is less than 10-8
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Bj/i =
∆Vj
∆Yi
(3.13)
4. E C O N O M I C M O D E L
4 .1 . two views on production in fisheries
In a traditional fisheries model (e.g. Getz and Haight 1989, Chap. 4), the
harvest is calculated by summing the contributions from all of the differ-
ently sized groups that are fished. In the size-spectrum model, this is an
integral over the abundance distribution wrt. size w (weight) of the fish,
N(w), weighted by the size-selectivity of the fishing gear, ω(w):
y = F
∫ ∞
0
ω(w)N(w)w dw (4.1)
where F is the overall fishing mortality.
Fisheries economists tend to instead use a production model, where
the harvest, y, is the production of a fishing vessel with the factor in-
puts of effort, E, and stock, S, where the fish stock is an environmental
variable.2 The traditional approximation is to apply a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function (e.g., Clark 1990, eq (2.8)):
y = qEαSγ (4.2)
The total production of the fleet is the sum of the productions of each
vessel. Assuming identical vessel and effort levels, total production will
have the same form as individual production:
y = n q
(
Etotal
n
)α
Sγ
= q′EαtotalS
γ (4.3)
2Stock is not a traditional production factor for the individual fisher as it is not under
his control. It is more of an exogenous environmental variable. However, in aggregate,
that is from a social viewpoint, the stock is endogenous and can be seen as a traditional
production factor.
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where n is the number of vessels, and q′ = n1−αq. Hence, the total harvest
function will be a scaled version of (4.2).
The two views on production can be unified by defining the stocks as:
S :=
∫ ∞
0
ω(w)N(w)w dw (4.4)
and the overall fishing mortality rate as:
F := q′EαtotalSγ−1 (4.5)
In this manner, the economic production view (4.3) and the model (4.1)
will give the same production, y.
The function Sγ−1 in the overall fishing mortality rate (4.5) will, with
the expectation of γ ∈ [0, 1), be a convex decreasing function, indicating
declining productivity with respect to increasing stock.
4 .2 . cost model
Effort is an ambiguous concept; economists prefer to work with physical
input factors such as labour, fuel, and provision (see e.g. Squires 1988):
y = q1x
α1
1 x
α2
2 · · · kβSγ (4.6)
where xi is variable input factors, and k is capital. Given (4.6), with cor-
responding prices pi and a fisher assumed to minimize cost, the input
factors are applied such that
xi
xj
=
αi
αj
pj
pi
(4.7)
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) give a production cost relationship:
y = q2GαkβSγ (4.8)
where
G = p · x (4.9)
α =∑ αi (4.10)
q2 = q1
(
∑
pi
αi
)α
∏
i
(
αi
pi
)αi
(4.11)
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The production function (4.8) can replace (4.2) to allow for the estimation
of a production function based on the accounting statistics for the individ-
ual vessel, which avoids the introduction of effort. It may seem equivalent
to have a fixed price on effort; however, by assuming cost minimization,
we allow for substitution when relative prices between factors change (see
Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard 2015, Chap. A).
Our objective is to analyse the ecosystem model from a long-run per-
spective. Therefore, we will derive a cost function under the assumption
that all of the factor inputs of the fishing fleet are completely variable,
which allows us to minimize both the operational and the capital costs.
With pk as the price of capital, the total cost per vessel is C = G + kpk.
If we assume that the ecosystem is in a steady state with a total harvest
of y, then the cost minimization problem is to find the number of vessels,
n, the operation cost, G, and the capital, k, such that:
(n, G, k) = argmin
n,G,k
n (G + kpk)
∣∣∣∣∣
y=nqGαkβSγ
(4.12)
By substituting n
(n, G, k) = argmin
n,G,k
y
(G + kpk)
qGαkβSγ
∣∣∣∣∣
n= y
qGαkβSγ
(4.13)
the cost minimization problem can be solved by first finding the opera-
tion cost and capital level where the unit cost is minimized, and then the
number of vessels. Minimizing the unit cost implies that the input factors
are applied in the ratio:
G
kpk
=
α
β
(4.14)
and, because we are looking for the long-run optimal level of capital, α+
β = 1. The total cost per vessel is then:
C = G + pkk = G
(
1+
β
α
)
=
G
α
(4.15)
The unit costs are:
C
y
=
G
α
q
(
β
αpk
)β
Gα+βSγ
= AS−γ (4.16)
12
Where
A = q−1β−βαβ−1 pβk (4.17)
If we do the analysis from a long-run perspective and assume an ideal
cost minimizing fleet, we expect that the unit cost of harvesting will be
of the form (4.16) if changes in the harvest in the short-run are small. Be-
cause section 4.1 established a relationship between the biological produc-
tion function (4.1) and the economic production function (4.8), with the
definition of stock given by (4.4), F can be used as the control variable in
the model, and the cost can be calculated using (4.16).
4 .3 . cost model parameters
The parameters for the cost model for the two fleets (Tab. 1) are estimated
for the North Sea on the basis of the accounting statistics, the landing
statistics and the ICES (International Council for Exploration of the Sea)
stock assessment summaries (ICES 2010b) (see Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen,
and Vestergaard 2015, Chap. A). The unit cost model (4.16) has two pa-
rameters A,γ and one variable S. The value of γ is independent of how S
is measured as long as it is proportional to the density of the fish in the
sea. However, the value of A will depend upon the way S is measured,
and there is no way to get from the spawning stock biomass, the metric
of ICES, to the density of fish per m3, the metric of the model. The ap-
proach taken is to calibrate the model to give a unit cost that is similar to
the one observed in the data. However, the rent in today’s fishery is zero
(Chap. A Tab. 2 and 3). The fishery where transferable quotas were first
introduced in Denmark was the herring and mackerel fishery (as a test in
2003, permanent since 2007); this is likely the most cost-efficient fishery
in Denmark, and we assume that the other sectors would be as efficient
if properly managed. Hence, the constant A is found by setting the rent
to 15.57% of the revenue in a fishery that resembles today’s fishery in the
North Sea.
4 .4 . price model
The price model is estimated using data from the Danish Landing Statis-
tics (estimation details in Chap. b). Two price models are needed: pf for
the forage fish fleet, and pl for the large fish fleet. The forage fish fleet
lands fish for reduction into fishmeal. Because there is no size sorting in
the landings, we assume a flat price with respect to the size of the landed
fish:
pf(w) = P (4.18)
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table 1 : Parameter estimates for the price and cost models
Parameter Estimate Std Error Units
P 0.1610 0.0053 ekg−1
$ 4.830 0.51 ekg−1
b 0.0295 0.00096 kg
a 5.38 0.25 kg
ι 0.5230 0.0039
γf 0.175 0.037
γl 0.280 0.016
Af 0.05748 Calibrated ekg−1
Al 0.2759 Calibrated ekg−1
The large fish fleet lands fish for human consumption. The prices de-
pend upon the size, grade and species. In the model, the size is presented
as a dimension; therefore, it is appropriate to give the price as a function
of the size:
pl(w) =
{
$
(
1− exp (− ((w− b)/a)ι)) w ≥ b
0 else
(4.19)
The function (4.19) is a scaled Weibull distribution function. Standard er-
rors (Tab. 1) are based on re-sampling (Efron and Tibshirani 1993) leading
to a coefficient of variation below 0.004.
Revenue for fleet i are found as:
Ri = Fi
∫ ∞
0
pi(w)ωi(w)N(w)w dw (4.20)
and rent:
pii = Ri − yi AiS−γi (4.21)
with yi and Si as respectively (4.1) and (4.4).
5. R E S U LT S
To illustrate the calculation of the benefit indicator, the state of the current
North Sea fishery is examined. We assume that the mean landings over
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the period from 2001–2009 represent the sustainable harvest the North Sea
can deliver in its present state. The mean landing is 1 990 304 ton year-1
(ICES 2010a); half is assumed to be from the forage fish fleet and half
from the large fish fleet. Our simulations depart from a model system in
equilibrium with these services and the benefit indicators are calculated
with a social discount rate of ρ = 3% pa.
A change in the fishing mortality of the forage fish fleet impacts the
production and rent of both fleets (Fig. 2). Initially, the harvest of the
forage fish fleet shows a big increase, followed by a reduction that levels
out at approximately half of the initial increase. The rent of the forage
fish fleet increases initially, but eventually it levels out close to zero. The
reason that the rent approaches zero, despite the increase in the harvest,
is due to a slight decrease in the density of fish; even though the elasticity
of the unit cost with respect to the density is only γ = 0.175, the result is
a slight increase in the unit cost that affects the harvest of the entire fleet.
For the large fish fleet change in fishing mortality of the forage fish fleet
results in a slight drop in the harvest followed by a sustained increase in
harvest volume. Despite the increase in the harvest of the large fleet, the
rent decreases. This decrease is due to a decrease in the size of the fish
in the large fish fleet’s harvest that leads to a lower market value. The
benefit indicator for the two fleets per forage fish is calculated according
to (3.13). The internal benefit to the forage fleet is a slight increase, but it
is offset by the much larger external benefit decrease to the large fish fleet.
The total benefit of an increase in forage fishing in the North Sea today is,
therefore, clearly negative.
The consequences of a change in the large fish fleet’s fishing mortal-
ity rate can be evaluated in a similar manner (Fig. 3). The production of
the large fish fleet shows the same pattern as the forage fish fleet, with
an initial high extra harvest followed by oscillations and settling at ap-
proximately half of the initial amount. The harvest of the forage fish fleet
increases initially due to the decreased predation pressure, but later it ap-
proaches zero as the predators again increase in number, although to a
slightly smaller number than before. The change in the rent of the forage
fish fleet is negligible, while the rent of the large fish fleet shows an initial
increase followed by a drastic decrease. This decrease in the rent, despite
the increase in harvest, is caused by two things: a slight decrease in the
fish density, which increases the unit cost, and a decrease in size of the
harvested fish, which decreases the market value. The total benefit of an
increase in the large fish fleet in the North Sea today is negative and, in
magnitude, higher than the externality imposed by the forage fish fleet.
Both benefit indicators of the present use of the North Sea are negative
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figure 2 : Calculation of the change in the benefit caused by a change in
the forage fish fleet. The starting point of the calculation is a steady state.
At time t = 0, the forage fish fleet fishing mortality is slightly changed,
while the fishing mortality of the large fish fleet is unchanged. The change
in the fishing mortality leads to a change in the production (upper panel)
and the rent (lower panel) of the forage fish fleet (solid lines) and the large
fish fleet (dashed lines).
table 2 : The benefit indicators of the present use of the North Sea.
With respect to Forage fish fleet Large fish fleet
Internal Benefit Bf/f 4.5e ton-1 Bl/l -1 093e ton-1
External Benefit Bl/f -71.6e ton-1 Bf/l -3e ton-1
Total Benefit B•/f -67.1e ton-1 B•/l -1 096e ton-1
(Tab. 2), the benefit of the ecosystem services from the North Sea could
be improved by reducing both fleets’ harvests.
Fig. 4 presents the internal and external benefit indicators calculated
with a discount rate of ρ = 3% pa. The zero contour lines in the two in-
ternal panels cross one another at point A. At this point society optimizes
the benefit from the two services but ignores the externality. The negative
externalities amount to -132 e ton-1 inflicted on the large fish fleet for the
marginal fish caught by the forage fish fleet and -12 e ton-1 on the forage
fish fleet for the marginal fish caught by the large fish fleet.
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figure 3 : Illustration of the benefit indicator method caused by a
change in the large fish fleet. The change in fishing mortality leads to
a change in the production (upper panel) and the rent (lower panel) of
the forage fish fleet (solid lines) and the large fish fleet (dashed lines).
To find a global optimum, the total benefit indicator must be consid-
ered (Fig. 5). The optimum is where the total benefit of the two fleets is
zero (point B). This point may be reached by approximately halving the
harvests of the two fleets.
The external benefit from the forage fish fleet (0–150 e ton-1) generally
far exceeds the internal benefit (0–30 e ton-1). This phenomenon implies
that the management of the forage fish fleet should consider the large fish
fleet. The zero contour line of the total benefit indicator for the forage
fish fleet follows diagonals up left and right from point B (Fig 5). This
result indicates that the optimal forage fish harvest is dependent upon
the volume of the large fish fleet’s harvest.
In contrast, in absolute values, the internal benefit of the large fish fleet
(0–1000 e ton-1) generally dwarfs the external benefit (0–12 e ton-1). Thus,
the influence of the large fish fleet on the forage fish fleet is rather small,
and it can, for practical purposes, be ignored. The zero contour line for
the large fish fleet in Fig 5 is vertical, indicating that the optimal harvest
level of the large fish fleet is independent of the forage fish fleet.
A striking result of Fig. 4 is that the forage fish fleet can create a
positive externality for the large fish fleet. To understand the mechanism
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figure 4 : The benefit indicators (e ton-1) for the North Sea forage fish
fleet (top) and large fish fleet (bottom) divided into internal benefit, Bi/i,
and external benefit, Bi/j. Four points of special interest are marked: the
plus sign is the current state of the North Sea, A is where the internal ben-
efits of the two fleets cross, B is where the total benefits of the two fleets
cross (Fig. 5), and C is an arbitrarily chosen point where the externality
on the large fish fleet from the forage fish fleet is positive
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figure 5 : Total benefit indicator (e ton-1) for the forage fish fleet, B•/f
(left), and the large fish fleet, B•/l (right). The points marked are the same
as in Fig. 4
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figure 6 : Abundance of fish as a function of individual size (both axes
logarithmic) at the points A-C in Figs. 4 and 5; A is dotted, B is solid, and
C is dashed. The abundance of forage fish (top) and large fish (bottom) is
scaled relative to the unfished situation. The grey regions illustrate each
fleet’s selection function.
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behind this result, the population level at three points, marked A, B, and
C in Fig. 4 and 5 are examined (Fig. 6). As the harvest of the forage fish is
increased, i.e., moving from point C to B, the abundance of large forage
fish within the size range targeted by the fishery decreases. The decreased
abundance of the forage fish releases the predation pressure on smaller
individuals in the size range of 1-10 g. The decreased abundance of large
forage fish affects the large fish in two opposite ways: 1) it removes some
of the food for the largest fish (> 1 kg), and 2) it reduces the competition
for food for the juvenile individuals of the large fish. Moving from C to B,
the effect of the reduced competition appears most important because the
large fish generally increase in abundance. Only when moving from B to
A are the very large fish (> 5 kg) negatively affected by the lower abun-
dance of food from the forage fish. The impact on abundance is modest,
but because the price of the large fish is high, this reduction is responsible
for the negative externality at high harvest rates.
6. D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
We have developed a general methodology to analyze the internal and
external consequences of fishing an ecosystem in terms of the benefit in-
dicator. The method has been applied to quantify the externalities that a
forage fish fleet and a large fish fleet in the North Sea generate for one
another. The generalization of the methodology to more than two ecosys-
tem services is straightforward. Even though the model is calibrated to
resemble the North Sea, it builds on properties that are generally found
across ecosystems. The results, therefore, have general value and may be
applied to other systems, at least in qualitative terms.
Economic analyses often look at the first order derivative, known as
the margin. This gives easy interpretative indicator, as for example Weitz-
man (2003)’s stationery rate of return3. The Weitzman’s stationery rate of
return give a easy interpretable number to compared with the discount
rate. We have here developed a indicator to inform about the trade-off
3The stationary rate of return is minus the ration between the marginal cash flow wrt.
capital and the marginal cash flow wrt. investment, all measured for a stationary capital.
With symbols:
R(k) = − gk
gk˙
(6.1)
where g(k, k˙) is the net cash flow as a function of capital k and investment k˙ (Weitzman
2003)
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when exploiting an marine ecosystem based on marginal analysis, equa-
tion (3.3). As we define our indicator based on an equilibrium situation,
our indicator resembles Weitzman’s’ stationary approach. However the
marine ecosystem is dynamic, and can not instantly go from one equilib-
rium situation to an other; there is a dynamic path that have economic
implications. The indicator is designed to capture this dynamic, by dis-
counting both the economic and physical changes.
While using the method of discounting seems to be widely accepted
for aggregating the economic outcome for a (infinite) time flow, equation
(3.2), using the method of discounting of the physical effect, equation (3.1),
seems to encounter some skepticism. This is, however, a method widely
used in cost effectiveness analysis in health technology assessment, recom-
mended for example by National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE 2012). Here the effect is evaluated by discount the benefit in form
of quality adjusted life years.
An alternative to our benefit indicter would be the discounted value of
the cash flow with a change in fishing mortality rate or fishing effort. Both
fishing mortality rate and fishing effort are model variables with no tangi-
ble physical realization. An indicator based on non tangible model prop-
erties is less informative than an indicator based on well known physical
entity. We therefore choose to use the quantity of removed fish as denom-
inator in our indicator. An other approach would be to find a implicit
discount rate similar to the Weitzman (2003)’s stationery rate of return;
similarly to the method applied in Ravn-Jonsen (2011). However, that will
not give an indicator divided into external and internal effect, and it will
only be computable for the part of the ecosystem states where there is an
intertemporal choice of exploitation (Ravn-Jonsen 2011).
As defined in section 3, the benefit indicator is interlinked to the choice
of control variable, as the control variable defines what continue as usual
and a change signify. To test how sensitive the benefit indicator is to the
choice of the control variable, the model was reformulated with the har-
vest as the control variable. The results are presented in Ravn-Jonsen, An-
dersen, and Vestergaard (2015, chap. E) and show consistency with the
found benefit indicator, with the exception of the external benefit from
the forage fish fleet. For the external benefit of the forage fleet, the zero
contour line moves up so that the value for today’s fishery changes from
-71e ton-1 to 100e ton-1. Nevertheless, the general picture and the optimal
point are convergent, which shows that the benefit indicator is a proper
indicator of the net benefit, though the values for the external benefit at
the present exploitation rate must be interpreted cautiously.
The intersection of the zero contour lines of the total benefit indicator
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in Fig. 5 indicates the economic optimum. For simplicity, the decision
variables have been reduced to two dimensions. In the real world, there
are many more possibilities for decision variables such as a change in the
size selectivity, a change in the selectivity with respect to the traits, or a
change in the fishing mortality over time. Therefore, it may be possible to
increase the benefit by exploring other dimensions of the control variable.
In current fishery management, securing the reproduction of the fish
stock is considered to be an important goal. The ecological model has
fixed reproduction, that is, there is no feedback from the abundance of
the adult fish onto the abundance of the offspring. This phenomenon is in
line with the classic yield-per-recruit analysis in fisheries science (Bever-
ton and Holt 1957). Thus, the shadow price of reproduction is not part of
the benefits calculated in Fig. 4 and 5. This approach is taken to highlight
only the trophic system, such that all of the effects stem from predation
and growth of the individual. Therefore, our analysis cannot stand alone;
reproduction must also be considered. However, the model indicates the
benefit from a substantial reduction in the harvest, which would simulta-
neously reduce the probability of reproduction failure.
The economic aspects of the model consist of a price model and a cost
model. Both of these models are based on data from Denmark; however,
because Danish fisheries are part of the global market, the models are
generic. The price model is divided into two parts: one for forage fish,
and one for large fish. Large fish are regarded as landed for direct human
consumption, and we find in the Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard
(2015, Chap. B) that price increases with size, with minor variations from
year to year. We are confident that the price model reflects the willing-
ness of the industry to pay with respect to size. However we notice that
the price analyse is static, without the dynamic caused by supply and de-
mand. We leave to future work to incorporate an economic marked in the
model.
The cost model is described as a power function of the biomass in
the sea. The model needs two parameters for each fleet, the exponents γi,
and the coefficients Ai. The value of the exponents differ between studies;
e.g., Sandberg (2006) found values in the range of 0.18 to 0.48 for different
herring and cod fleets, and Eide et al. (2003) found 0.42 for cod. Compared
to those studies, the values found in the present study (0.18 and 0.28) are
on the low end. In Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard (2015, Chap.
D), the sensitivity of this parameter is tested by increasing the exponents
by a factor of 1.5. The change in γ does not qualitatively change figures 4
or 5. The value of the benefit to the forage fish fleet is slightly sensitive to
a change in the exponent, while the large fish fleet is almost insensitive.
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As our model does not use the same stock concepts as the ICES stock
assessments, we have calibrated the coefficients in the cost model so that
the present fishery gives 15.57% rent—the same as the best-managed fish-
ery in Denmark. This is a rough estimate, as the present fishery yields zero
rent (Chap. A, Tab. 2 and 3). In Ravn-Jonsen, Andersen, and Vestergaard
(2015, Chap. D), the sensitivity of this calibration is tested by calibrating
under the assumption of zero rent in the present fishery. Again, the fig-
ures do not change qualitatively; however, the value of the benefit to the
forage fish fleet is more sensitive to this parameter than is the value to the
large fish fleet. The reason for this difference in sensitivity between the
two fleets stems from the underlying price structures: while the large fish
fleet benefits from an increase in the price caused by the increase in the
size of the fish as a result of the relieved exploitation level, the forage fish
fleet has a flat price relative to the size of the fish. Since both fleets benefit
from an increase in density as a result of the relived exploitation levels in
the form of a decreased unit cost. However, for large fish, the change in
price dominates the change in cost. The economics of the forage fish fleet
are then dominated by the density effect on the cost, and for the large fish
fleet, the economics are dominated by the price response to the size of the
fish.
The size-spectrum model has been used for ecological impact assess-
ments of fishing on the ecosystem (Andersen and Pedersen 2010; Houle
et al. 2013; Jacobsen, Gislason, and Andersen 2014). One common impres-
sion from those analyses was that a fishery on the large fish imposed a
positive influence on the forage fish, due to the reduced predation pres-
sure on the forage fish when the consumer fish were removed. In contrast,
the results from present model, as presented in Fig. 4, uncovers that the
externality on the forage fish fleet generated by the large fish fleet is ig-
norable. The externality is ignorable because it is dwarfed by the intertem-
poral cost in the large fish fleet’s own fishery if it is not managed close to
the optimum. The contrast in interpretation between present model and
the others highlights the importance of economic analyses over purely
ecological analyses of the impact of fishing on an ecosystem.
There are situations where the forage fish fleet generates a positive
externality on the large fish fleet, and there are situations where they gen-
erate a negative externality. The explanation for this phenomenon must be
observed in the different functions the species fill for one another during
their lifespan. If we focus on a mature forage fish, that is approximately
100g, it will fill three different functions with respect to the large fish
species: 1) the function of a predator on larvae and juveniles, 2) the func-
tion of a competitor to similarly sized fish and 3) the function of prey
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(forage fish) for larger fish. The first two have a negative influence, while
the last has a positive influence. The economic analysis shows that this
triple functionality leads to a requirement of accommodating the harvest
of forage fish and to the exploration of the large fish. Traditional bioe-
conomic models have been centred on the mature fish. The multi-species
models that include interaction with the mature level that do exist, such as
the Lotka-Volterra type model, are restricted to modelling predator-prey,
competition or mutualism, but not all three at once. Consequently, these
models disregard an important part of the ecological functionality.
Concluding remarks
Overall, this model shows that the exploitation of the forage species has
a notable economic impact on the large species fishery, but the reverse is
not true. The analysis shows that the naïve perception, where the forage
species is only viewed as food for the large species, is too simple. The
predation of the forage fish species on the juveniles of the large species
and the competition between the forage fish species and the juveniles of
the large species can, if the density of the forage fish is too high, domi-
nate over the function of the forage fish as prey. Thus, the harvest of the
forage fish must be adjusted to the harvest of the large fish. The present
management of the North Sea is, given the current exploitation rate of
the large fish, not far from having the right forage fish harvest. How-
ever, the model’s optimal point (481·103 ton year-1, 489 · 103 ton year-1) is
approximately half of the current harvest in the North Sea, which indi-
cates that the present exploitation is too high. To improve the utilization
of the ecosystem, management must acknowledge the externalities that
the fisheries impose upon one another.
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